All Persons that entered into a Mexican Government Bond Transaction, denominated in Mexican Pesos, at any time between at least January 1, 2006, and April 19, 2017, where such persons were either domiciled in the United States or its territories or, if domiciled outside the United States or its territories, transacted in the United States or its territories.

Various types of Mexican Government Bonds (“MGB”), including CETES, BONOS, UDIBONOS, and BONDES D

The complaint alleges that defendants conspired to fix MGB prices between January 1, 2006 and April 18, 2017 through at least three means: 1) rigging MGB auctions through collusive bidding and information sharing; 2) selling MGBs purchased at auction at artificially higher prices; and 3) agreeing to fix the “bid-ask spread” artificially wider, overcharging and underpaying customers in every MGB transaction by suppressing the “bid price” at which defendants offered to buy MGBs and increasing the “ask price” at which they offered to sell. The scheme resulted in inflated MGB prices, and lower yield for plaintiffs and the class while generating supra-competitive profits for defendants.

Mexican Government Bond Antitrust:

Class action on behalf of all persons that entered into a Mexican Government Bond (MGB) transaction between January 1, 2006 to April 19, 2017 where such persons were either domiciled in the United States, its territories or the District of Columbia, or if domiciled outside the United States or its territories, or the District of Columbia, transacted in the United States or its territories or the District of Columbia. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their employees, agents, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries and co-conspirators, whether or not named in this complaint and the United States Government.

The defendants allegedly conspired to fix MGB prices between January 1, 2006 and April 19, 2017 through at least three means:

1. Rigging MGB auctions through collusive bidding and information sharing;
2. Selling MGBs purchased at auction at artificially higher prices; and
3. Agreeing to fix the ‘bid-ask spread” artificially wider, overcharging and underpaying customers in every MGB transaction by suppressing the “bid price” at which defendants offered to buy MGBs and increasing the “ask price” at which they offered to sell.

The scheme resulted in inflated MGB prices, and lower yield for plaintiffs and the class while generating supra-competitive profits for defendants.